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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Freedom of Expression-Nude
Dancing Conveying a Message of Eroticism and Sexuality
Is Protected by the First Amendment but Can Be
Limited Under State Police Powers Provided the
Government Establishes a Substantial,
Content-Neutral Purpose.
-

U.S.

Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 115 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1991).

In 1985, the Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre, operated businesses in
South Bend, Indiana that offered nude and semi-nude dancing.' Darlene
Miller and Gayle Ann Marie Sutro were employed as performers with the
Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre, respectively. 2 The Kitty Kat Lounge,
Glen Theatre, Miller, and Sutro challenged the enforcement of the Indiana
Public Indecency Statute contending that its ban on nudity in public places
violated the First Amendment. 3 The United States District Court for the
1.Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., - U.S. -, _ Il1 S. Ct. 2456, 2458-59, 115 L. Ed. 2d
504, 509-10 (1991). The Kitty Kat Lounge sold alcoholic beverages and offered "go-go dancing." Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2458, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 509. Glen Theatre operated a "bookstore"
which, along with printed materials and movie showings, offered booths with glass panels
through which adult customers could pay to view nude and semi-nude female performers. Id.
at -.
_,Il S. Ct. 2459, 115 L. Ed. 2d 509-10.
Ill S. Ct. at 2459, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 509, 510. Miller worked only as a dancer
2. Id. at,
but Sutro was a professional dancer, model, and actress and could also be seen in a pornographic movie at a local theater. Id.
3. Id. at - n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 2459 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 510 n.2. The Indiana Public
Indecency Statute, IND. CODE § 35-45-4-1 (1988) provides:
Public Indecency
Sec. 1. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally, in a public place:
(1) engages in sexual intercourse;
(2) engages in deviate sexual conduct;
(3) appears in a state of nudity; or
(4) fondles the genitals of himself or another person; commits public indecency, a Class A
misdemeanor.
(b) 'Nudity' means the showing of the human male or female genitals, pubic area, or
buttocks with less than a fully opaque covering, the showing of the female breast with less
than a fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing of the covered male
genitals in a discernibly turgid state.
Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2462, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513. The Kitty Kat Lounge and Glen Theatre
desired to present nude dancing but required its dancers to wear pasties and a G-string to
avoid violation of the Indiana statute. Id. at -., IIIS. Ct. at 2458-59, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 509-10.
Miller, whose pay was based on a commission of drink sales, believed her pay would increase if
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Northern District of Indiana granted an injunction against enforcement of
the statute finding the statute facially overbroad. 4 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's decision on
the basis that previous litigation in the Indiana Supreme Court precluded an
overbreadth challenge.' On remand, the district court determined that the
application of the statute to the nude dancing did not violate the First
Amendment. 6 The case was once more appealed to the Seventh Circuit
which reversed the decision of the district court and rendered a decision en
banc, concluding that the nude dancing qualified as expression worthy of
First Amendment protection and, therefore, the indecency statute could not
validly be applied to such conduct.7 The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine the constitutionality of applying the Indiana
Public Indecency Statute to the nude dancing involved.' Held-Reversed.
Nude dancing conveying a message of eroticism and sexuality is protected by
the First Amendment but can be limited under state police powers provided
the government establishes a substantial, content-neutral purpose. 9
Although the First Amendment expressly guarantees only the right of free
speech, it has been interpreted as encompassing forms of non-verbal expression.1 0 However, because most forms of conduct carry some expressive

she were able to dance completely nude. Id. Sutro contended that application of the Indiana
statute to her dancing would unconstitutionally limit the erotic and sexual message she sought
to convey. Id. at . Il11 S. Ct. at 2460, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 511.
4. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2459, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 510. The district court determined that
the statute was facially overbroad because its sanctions applied to all individuals who appeared
nude in public without any exception. Id.
5. Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2459, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 510. The court of appeals
determined that, to save the public indecency statute from a facial overbreadth attack, the
Indiana Supreme Court had given the statute a limiting construction providing that although
there is no right to appear nude in public, nudity may have to be constitutionally allowed
where it is part of a larger form of expression that qualifies for constitutional protection. Id.
The court of appeals then remanded the case to the district court for a decision as to whether
the Indiana statute violated the First Amendment rights of the businesses and dancers as applied to the nude dancing involved. Id.
6. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2459, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 510. The district court determined that
the nude dancing involved did not qualify as expression protected by the First Amendment.
Id.
7. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2459-60, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 510-11. The court of appeals held that
the Indiana statute, the purpose of which was to prohibit the dancers from conveying a
message of eroticism and sexuality, violated First Amendment protection of expression. Id.
8. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2460, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 911.
9. Barnes, - U.S. at- .- , 111 S. Ct. at 2462, 2463, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 514, 515. The
Indiana Public Indecency Statute's requirement that the dancers employed by the establishments involved wear pasties and a G-string is valid under the First Amendment. Id.
10. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969) (students wearing armbands as symbol of protest of Vietnam War determined to be
symbolic act within Free Speech Clause of First Amendment); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
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quality, it is necessary to determine whether the given conduct embodies
sufficient communicative elements so as to qualify for First Amendment protection."1 The Supreme Court has formally established that conduct qualifies for First Amendment protection only where there has been an
intentional conveyance of a particularized message with a great likelihood
that the message will be understood. 2
Once conduct has been determined to qualify as expression protected by
the First Amendment, it becomes necessary to determine what protection
such conduct deserves. 3 In making this decision, the Court has tradition-

131, 141 (1966) (conduct of five blacks in refusing to leave racially segregated reading room of
public library qualified as speech protected by First Amendment); Stromberg v. California,
283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (holding regulation prohibiting display of red flag as symbol of opposition to organized government unconstitutional). The term "freedom of expression" is commonly used to avoid the strict connotations associated with the term "freedom of speech" and
thus includes other forms of protected activity. FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 50 (1982). An endearing example of this concept is The Boston

Tea Party. See James E. Leahy, "Flamboyant Protest" The First Amendment and the Boston
Tea Party, 36 BROOK. L. REV. 185, 210 (1970) (although "Indians" made no verbal expression
they clearly conveyed a message).
11. Compare Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24 (1989) (holding conduct of dance hall
patrons not sufficiently expressive to qualify for First Amendment protection) with Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (explaining that although placing peace symbol on
American Flag could be interpreted as bizarre behavior, majority of viewers would understand
actor's intent to convey message of disfavor with government). Cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J. dissenting) (all speech contains some element of conduct).
Reversing Holmes' aphorism-that every incitement is an idea-all conduct is capable of conveying an idea or message. MELLVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, A
TREATISE ON THE THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT § 3-44 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (recognizing burning of American Flag as expression protected by First Amendment); Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11 (1974)
(recognizing peace symbol affixed to American Flag as expression protected by First Amendment). The essential element of this test is the intent to convey a message. Note, Symbolic
Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1109-10 (1968). Furthermore, such intent will generally
be assertive in nature, characterized by a departure from the actor's standard behavior that can
best be explained as a desire to communicate a particular message. Id. However, the actor's
intent to convey a message does not necessarily have to be assertive. See Melville B. Nimmer,
The Meaning ofSymbolic Speech Underthe FirstAmendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 37 (1973)
(individual's choice of clothing may be made with intent to convey personal message). It is
also important to note that the Court has interpreted the First Amendment to protect the right
not to engage in expressive conduct. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (recognizing right to not display state motto on autombile license plate).
13. See, e.g, Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 316 (1967) (requiring parade
and demonstration permits recognized as potentially violative of First Amendment); Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 535, 555 (1965) (expressive conduct is not afforded the same constitutional
protection as pure speech); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 502 (1949)
(allowing state to prohibit union picketing under antitrade restraint law). The view taken by
the Court in these cases could be based on a realization that most conduct can feasibly qualify
as expression. See FREDERICH SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 52
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ally applied what can be labeled a "two-track" approach to determine the
constitutionality of a regulation of expressive conduct.' 4 Track-one deals
with governmental regulations which are aimed at curtailing the communicative impact of expressive conduct. 5 Such regulations are commonly labeled as "content-based."' 6 Under track-one analysis, content-based
regulations are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. 7 Track-two analyzes the

(1982) (because almost any activity can be self-expression, more expressive forms of expression
should be isolated). But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IowA L.
REV. 1i1, 114 (1989) (because of emotive power, non-verbal expression can be more effective
in conveying speaker's feelings than verbal speech alone).
14. This approach has its roots in established case law. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (Constitution does not grant absolute right to free speech).
However, the term "two-track" was coined by Professor Laurence Tribe. LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (2d ed. 1988). Similar analyses have
been advanced by other commentators, most notably the "two-level theory" developed by Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960
Sup. CT. REV. 1, 10-12 (Professor Kalven's theory is for all practical purposes identical to
Professor Tribe's two-track approach).
15. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 534, 537 (1980)
(recognizing prohibition of literature addressing nuclear power as curtailing communicative
impact of such material); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) (recognizing prohibition of films containing nudity as curtailing communicative impact of such material); Police Dep't. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (recognizing ordinance
prohibiting all picketing, except labor picketing, as curtailing communicative impact of such
conduct). Regulations which restrict the communicative impact of expression are presumptively at odds with the First Amendment. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792 (2d ed. 1988).
16. See, e.g, Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211 (labelling ordinance which prohibited only films
containing nudity as content-based); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (recognizing ordinance prohibiting
picketing but making exception for labor disputes as content-based). Premier examples of
content-based legislation are regulations prohibiting desecration of the American Flag. See
Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag Burning and the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111, 114 (1989) (flag
desecration statute invalid). Another example is a Texas law making desecration of the American Flag a criminal offense which was held to be content-based. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 412.
Because "desecrate" was defined as an act that would "seriously offend," the regulation was
necessarily aimed at curtailing the communicative impact of such an act. Id. at 411.
17. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 536 (heightened scrutiny is necessary when
regulation is content-based); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978)
(subjecting statute prohibiting corporate expenditures made to influence voters to exacting
scrutiny); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-99 (holding that state's justification for prohibiting only certain forms of picketing must be carefully scrutinized). Some authorities would hold contentbased restrictions on free speech presumptively unconstitutional. LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 791-94 (2d ed. 1988). Three bases for this particularly harsh view are: (I) the distortion of public debate caused by content-based regulations, (2) the presumption that content-based regulations represent the government's
impermissible attempt to restrict a particular message, and (3) the presumption that contentbased regulations represent the government's impermissible attempt to curtail the communicative impact of speech. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions,54 U. CHI. L. REV.
46, 57 (1987).
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validity of regulations which are aimed at the noncommunicative impact of
expressive conduct but nevertheless have an effect on the actor's ability to
convey a message.18 Such regulations are labeled as "content-neutral." 19
The predominant test under track-two analysis was formulated in United
States v. O'Brien.20 Under the four-part O'Brien test, a regulation of expressive conduct will be justified: (1) if it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; (2) if it furthers an important or substantial government
interest; (3) if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest. 2

18. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 792 (1989) (analyzing validity
of ordinance regulating noise levels at municipal amphitheater and its potential interference
with artistic judgment); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295
(1984) (analyzing regulation preventing camping in national park and its effect on demonstrators seeking to protest plight of homeless); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648-50 (1981) (analyzing validity of regulation limiting number
of organizations at state fair and its effect on religious sect seeking to distribute literature).
Such regulations are generally valid so long as they do not overly restrict the flow of information. Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792 (2d ed. 1988).
19. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 792 (labeling regulation of noise levels at municipal amphitheater as content-neutral method of avoiding intrusion into residential areas); Clark, 468
U.S. at 295 (labeling restriction of camping in national park as content-neutral method of
maintaining condition of park); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 648-49 (limiting number of organizations
allowed to distribute material at state fair not based on content). A simple example of a content-neutral regulation is a law limiting the speed on a city's streets. Geoffrey R. Stone, Flag
Burning and the Constitution, 75 IOWA L. REV. 111, 112 (1989). Under such a law, an individual who speeds because he is late for a speaking engagement, or even an individual who
speeds as a symbolic statement of dissatisfaction with the posted speed limit, will have his
speech curtailed not because of the content of his message but rather because his reckless
behavior endangers fellow citizens. Id. However, the distinction between content-based and
content-neutral is often subtle. Compare Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110-11
(1972) (city ordinance prohibiting demonstrations near schools content-neutral because it curtailed only disruptive conduct not demonstrators' message) with Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94 (city
ordinance prohibiting all demonstrations near schools content-based because it contained exception for labor picketing).
20. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
21. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The four part test in O'Brien has been the prevailing test
used to examine the validity of content-neutral legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Albertini,
472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (statute prohibiting re-entry to military base upheld against First
Amendment claims of demonstrator); Wayne v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985) (upholding indictment of individual who failed to register under the Military Selective Service
Act); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984) (regulation prohibiting posting of campaign signs upheld). However, the O'Brien test has been criticized because of its requirement that a regulation of expressive conduct be only "no greater
than is essential" to further the government's interests. See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag
Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment
Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1488-89 (1975) (this requirement can be interpreted to
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A common form of regulation restricts expressive conduct by placing limitations on the time, place, or manner of such conduct.2 2 Where such regulations are content-neutral, the appropriate track-two analysis is to determine
if the regulation serves a significant governmental interest, and in serving
23
that interest, leaves open ample alternative channels for communication.
Under this analysis, the more restrictive the regulation is of expressive conduct, the more substantial the governmental interest must be.24
prohibit only a "gratuitous inhibition of expression"). Further criticism is based upon the
argument that the government can, under O'Brien, intentionally curtail conduct because of its
message. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212, 1215-16 (1970) (motive of curtailing expression because of its
message could be disguised with facially valid regulations).
22. See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 797-98 (municipal noise ordinance regulating noise levels
at amphitheater is valid content-neutral regulation of place and manner of expressive conduct);
Clark, 468 U.S. at 298-99 (regulation prohibiting camping in park is valid as applied to demonstrators); Heffron, 452 U.S. at 649-50 (regulation limiting number of groups allowed to distribute merchandise at state fair is valid). See generally C. Edwin Baker, Unreasoned
Reasonableness: Mandatory Parade Permits and Time, Place, and Manner Regulations, 78
Nw. U. L. REV. 937 (1983) (discussing time, place, and manner regulations).
23. See, e.g., Heffron, 452 U.S. at 647-48 (regulation which limited organizations at state
fair valid as applied to religious sect); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (regulating advertising of prescription drug
prices unconstitutional because governmental interest did not justify total prohibition of such
information); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-08 (1940) (requiring state approval
before soliciting invalid prior restraint of protected speech leaving no alternative channels for
communication). In recent decisions, the Court has treated this standard as interchangeable
with the O'Brien test. Albertini, 472 U.S. at 687-90 (reconciling O'Brien test with traditional
time, place, and manner analysis by stating that regulation need not be least restrictive alternative); Clark, 468 U.S. at 293-94 (upholding content-neutral regulation of expressive conduct
under both O'Brien test and time, place, and manner analysis); Taxpayersfor Vincent, 466 U.S.
at 805-08 (combining O'Brien test and time, place, and manner analysis). The Clark and Taxpayersfor Vincent decisions show that the two tests are not only fungible but have possibly
been merged by the Court. David S. Day, The Hybridization of the Content-NeutralStandards
for the Free Speech Clause, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 195, 215 (1987). Where time, place, and manner
regulations are determined to be valid, they serve merely to channel expressive conduct into
more appropriate avenues and do not substantially eliminate the message expressive conduct
seeks to convey. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 67
(1987). However, time, place, and manner regulations that seek to restrict expressive conduct
because of its content have commonly been subjected to the same judicial scrutiny as other
content-based regulations. ARCHIBALD Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 52 (1981).
24. Compare Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972) (upholding regulation prohibiting distribution of handbills within privately-owned shopping center) with
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (governmental interest in limiting noise, litter, and
traffic insufficient justification for ordinance entirely prohibiting political, labor, and religious
handbilling). See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839 (1976) (upholding regulation preventing political candidates from speaking on military base). Thus, the rule that has developed
concerning content-neutral regulations is that, absent a significant abridgement of an actor's
ability to convey his message, the government need only show a rational relationship between
the regulation and the desired goal. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
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Time, place, and manner regulations which restrict expressive conduct
based on either the subject-matter of the message or on the viewpoint of the

actor have traditionally been classified as content-based." The Court has
traditionally subjected all content-based time, place, and manner regulations
to track-one analysis, upholding them only where the state can show that its
regulation is narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest. 26 Thus, the distinction between subject-matter and viewpoint based
time, place, and manner regulations was not important.2 7 For example, in

LAW § 12-23, at 982 (2d ed. 1988). However, where sufficient alternative avenues of communication do exist, content-neutrality alone should not be enough to justify a regulation of expression. See John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConsitutionalLaw,
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1335 (1970) (state has obligation to protect channels of communication
even if this requires sacrificing state's interest). Thus, there is a requirement that the government do more than avoid only gratuitous burdens on expressive conduct. Id. at 1340.
25. See ConsolidatedEdison, 447 U.S. at 544 (holding unconstitutional prohibition of all
inserts in utility bills addressing issue of nuclear power). The commission in Consolidated
Edison argued that because its regulation restricted all information, both for and against nuclear energy, it was acceptable. Id. The commission contended that its regulation was content-neutral because it was aimed at a particular subject-matter (nuclear energy) and not a
particular viewpoint concerning that subject. Id. However, the Court refused to distinguish
between the two forms of regulation and ruled that the regulation was an unconstitutional,
content-based restriction of protected speech. Id. When the Court has made a distinction
between viewpoint and subject matter it has traditionally looked at the express language of the
regulation. Note, The Content Distinction in FreeSpeech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1904, 1906 (1989). For example, a regulation prohibiting all handbilling regarding abortion would be considered a subject-matter regulation. Id. But, a regulation that prohibited all
pro-choice handbilling would be considered a viewpoint regulation. Id. This distinction can
be difficult. Compare Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110-11 (prohibiting all demonstrations in vicinity
of school labeled content-neutral regulation) with Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94 (prohibiting all demonstrations in vicinity of school labeled as subject-matter based regulation because of laborpicketing exception).
26. See, e.g., ConsolidatedEdison, 447 U.S. at 544 (governmental interest of maintaining
operation of public utility insufficient to prohibit inclusion of information in public utility bills
concerning nuclear energy); Belotti, 435 U.S. at 795 (governmental interest of protecting citizens insufficient to justify prohibiting corporate, political contributions). Routinely, the determination as to whether a regulation is content-based has been made by examining the face of
the regulation. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 211 (1983). See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (labeling
regulation of child pornography content-based despite content-neutral purpose of protecting
children). However, if a regulation is facially content-neutral but the underlying governmental
motivation was to restrict the communicative impact of expressive conduct, the regulation may
still be invalid. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 794 (2d
ed. 1988).
27. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211-12 (holding subject-matter based regulation of movies
displayed at drive-in theaters invalid); see also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939)
(requiring municipal approval before distributing handbills held invalid). Time, place, and
manner regulations based on the content of the message conveyed have traditionally represented the government's impermissible attempt to suppress "harmful" information. ARCHI-
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decisions such as Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,2" the Court held

that an ordinance banning picketing within the vicinity of public schools was
invalid because its exception for labor disputes, made the ordinance contentbased and therefore unconstitutional.29 However, a study of the Supreme
Court's more recent treatment of content-based time, place, and manner regulations provides a unique view of the Court's changing attitude towards
nude dancing and similar conduct.3 °
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,3 1 the Court was content to apply
track-one analysis as developed in Mosley. 32 Confronted with an ordinance
which regulated drive-in theaters because of the nudity in the films they displayed, the Court labeled the regulation as an unconstitutional attempt to
restrict expression based on the content of its message.33 However, the
Court has moved away from this traditional view and has allowed significant
inroads towards the restriction of sexually oriented businesses.3 4

BALD Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 59-60 (1981).

Typically, once a regulation was been

determined to be content-based, it would be held invalid regardless of governmental attempts
to give a content-neutral basis for the regulation. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech
Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1906-07 (1989).
28. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
29. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98-100. It is important to note that the Court conceded that a
city might have a significant interest in prohibiting the disruption of public schools. Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 204
(1983). However, because the ordinance in Mosley prohibited picketing based on content it
was necessarily invalid. Id. at 203-04.
30. Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 211-12 (1975) (holding
subject-matter based regulation of movies displayed at drive-in theaters unconstitutional) and
Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100 (holding selective restriction of picketing based on subject-matter unconstitutional) with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (upholding subject-matter based regulation of adult theaters) and Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (upholding subject-matter based regulation of adult
theaters). This transition in the Court's treatment of subject-matter based time, place, and
manner regulations has been contradictory and imprecise. Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of
Speech Because of its Content: The PeculiarCase of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L.
REV. 81, 99 (1978). For example, the rationale for allowing content-based time, place, and
manner regulations varied between the similar fact situations of Renton and American Mini
Theatres. See Note, The Content Distinction in FreeSpeech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV.
L. REV. 1904, 1909-11 (1989). In American Mini Theaters, the Court based its decision on
sexually oriented material's lower expressive value. However, in Renton, the Court labeled the
regulation as content-neutral.
31. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
32. See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (explaining that government cannot act as censor to
shield public from offensive speech..
33. Id. at 211-12. The Court stated that, although the government could use time, place,
and manner regulations to protect the privacy rights of individuals, the government could not
shield the public from the films simply because it found the content of the message conveyed to
be offensive. Id. at 209.
34. See, e.g. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (upholding subject-matter based regulation of adult
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Sexually oriented businesses, such as those offering nude dancing, are
often associated with criminal and other undesirable behavior. a5 The Court
has accepted the governmental interest in curtailing such secondary effects
as justification for subject-matter based regulations of expressive conduct.36
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,37 the Court ruled that an ordinance which regulated the location of adult theaters based on the subjectmatter of the material they displayed was not in conflict with the First
Amendment.38 Although the Court's decision focused on the lower protection granted sexually oriented material, 39 it also hinted that subject-matter
based regulations could be justified as a method of combatting the
secondary
4
0
businesses.
oriented
sexually
with
associated
are
which
effects
Recognizing the paradox between the decisions in Erznoznik and American Mini Theatres, the Court soon attempted to bring its changing attitude

theaters as content-neutral regulation of expressive conduct); American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. at 63 (upholding subject-matter based regulation of adult theaters because of conduct's
lower expressive value); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973)(upholding
ordinance regulating commercial exhibition of obscene material on private property). This line
of cases granted municipalities considerable discretion in placing time, place, and manner restrictions on sexually oriented businesses. See Ronald M. Stem, Note, Sex, Lies, and Prior
Restraints: "Sexually Oriented Business"-The New Obscenity, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 253, 273
(1991) (discussing impact of Renton). As such, this trend marked a substantial revision of
First Amendment doctrine. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1908 (1989).
35. See, e.g. Northend Cinema, Inc. v. Seattle, 585 P.2d 1153, 1156 (1978) (recognizing
harmful effects of adult theaters on surrounding neighborhood); Renton, 475 U.S. at 51 (recognizing validity of Northend Cinema finding); American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34
(acknowledging community's interest in curtailing secondary effects of adult theaters).
36. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 54, 55 (governmental interest in curtailing secondary effects
sufficient to justify regulating location of adult theaters); see also American Mini Theatres, 427
U.S. at 71 (acknowledging city's interest in preserving quality of community life). Although
the Court initially labeled sexually oriented material as low value speech, it has moved away
from this distinction. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1911 (1989). Therefore, later decisions did much to erode that part of
the American Mini Theatre decision which classified sexually oriented conduct as lower in
expressive value. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) (explaining
that nudity alone will not deny First Amendment protection).
37. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
38. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 63. The city of Detroit, Michigan sought to
disperse movie theaters and other businesses which displayed "specified sexual activities" or
"specified anatomical areas" by prohibiting such businesses from being operated within 1000
feet of a similar business or within 500 feet of a residential area. Id. at 52-53.
39. Id. at 70-71.
40. See American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 (acknowledging community's interest in
curtailing secondary effects at adult theaters). The Court explained that such a regulation
could be justified if it was aimed at curtailing secondary effects and not at restricting "offensive" expressive conduct. See id. at 71 n.34 (comparing valid ordinance with ordinance held
unconstitutional in Erznoznik).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

9

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 23 [2022], No. 2, Art. 10

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[V/ol. 23:563

towards adult entertainment back into the traditional two-track approach. 4'
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,42 the Court was faced with an
ordinance that was strikingly similar to that of American Mini Theatres.43

In Renton, adult theaters were regulated based on the subject-matter of the
material they displayed." Following the reasoning developed in American
Mini Theatres, the Court determined that the ordinance sought to regulate

the theaters based on the secondary effects of such businesses and not based

on the content of the material displayed. 4 The Court then took its secondary effects analysis one step further explaining that because the ordinance
was not regulating the adult theaters based on the material they displayed, it
could validly be labeled a content-neutral regulation. 46 Accordingly, the
Court determined that the appropriate test for determining the validity of
such an ordinance was whether the ordinance was "designed to serve a substantial governmental interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues
of communication"-the traditional track-two test for content-neutral time,
place, and manner regulations of expressive conduct.4 7
Although prior Supreme Court decisions hinted at applying less demanding scrutiny to content-based time, place, and manner regulations, the Renton test4" marked a significant revision in the Court's First Amendment

41. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (subject-matter based regulation of adult theaters is contentneutral). Prior to Renton, there had been no attempt to create a new form of content-neutrality based on secondary effects. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After
Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1909 (1989).
42. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
43. Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 44 (grouping adult theaters by prohibiting their location
within 1000 feet of residential zone) with American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 52 (dispersing
adult theaters by prohibiting their location within 1000 feet of similar businesses). The facts in
Renton were virtually a clone of those in American Mini Theatres. Ronald M. Stem, Sex, Lies,
and PriorRestraints: "Sexually OrientedBusiness"--The New Obscenity, 68 U. DET. L. REV.
253, 271-72 (1991).
44. Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 44 with American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. at 53 (defining "adult motion picture theater" as facility displaying "specified sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas").
45. Renton, 475 U.S. at 47.
46. Id. at 48.
47. Id. at 50. The Court granted even more room for the regulation of sexually oriented
business by providing that the city need not prove the detrimental effects of the theaters in
question but could instead rely on studies performed in other cities to support its regulation.
Id. at 51-52. Furthermore, although the ordinance appeared under-inclusive in its application
to only adult theaters, the Court explained that there was no reason why the city could not
choose to address the potential problems associated with adult theaters before it addressed the
harmful secondary effects of other businesses. Id. at 52-53.
48. A regulation aimed at the secondary effects of a particular conduct and not at the
message conveyed will qualify as a content-neutral regulation and therefore will be valid so
long as it serves "substantial government interest and allows for reasonable alternative avenues
of communication." Renton, 475 U.S. at 47-50.
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analysis.4 9 Furthermore, consistent application since its development
tends
50

to show that the Renton test has become an established doctrine.
Revised interpretations of established constitutional doctrines have not
been the only tool used by the Supreme Court to allow more room for the

regulation of nude dancing and other adult entertainment. 51 In Arcara v.
Cloud Books, Inc.,52 the Court clearly established that incidental infringements upon First Amendment freedoms will not invoke First Amendment
analysis of a content-neutral regulation. 53 In California v. LaRue,54 the

49. Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (upholding subject-matter based regulation of expressive conduct) with Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (holding subject-matter based regulation of expressive conduct unconstitutional). The track-two analysis used by the Court in Renton
provides the potential for circumventing the strict judicial scrutiny traditionally applied to
content-based regulations. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1923 (1989) (content-based legislation can always be defended
as attempt to curtail secondary effects). Therefore, the Renton test potentially removes the
constitutional protection from forms of expressive conduct recognized as falling within the
boundaries of the First Amendment. See Ronald M. Stern, Note, Sex, Lies, and Prior Restraints: "Sexually Oriented Business"--The New Obscenity, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 253, 282
(1991) (Court stripped First Amendment protection from protected expression in Renton).
50. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 837 F.2d 1298, 1303 (5th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 493
U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 596, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990) (following Renton test to uphold ordinance
which regulated sexually oriented business based on secondary effects of such businesses).
However, it is important to note that the Court has kept the potential discriminatory power of
the Renton test in check. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. - -, 110 S. Ct. 596,
606, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603, 620 (1990) (striking down subject-matter based time, place, and manner regulation). The Court has suggested that the Renton test could be applicable to expressive
conduct other than that offered by sexually oriented businesses. See Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S.
312, 321 (1988) (government could use secondary-effects to justify restriction of political expression with sufficient content-neutral purpose).
51. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (closure of adult
bookstore valid application of statute prohibiting prostitution); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57 (1973) (declining constitutional protection to obscene material); California
v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114 (1972)(expanding Twenty-First Amendment to include power to
regulate sexual performances offered within establishments selling alcohol). But see Doran v.
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-33 (1975) (upholding temporary injunction preventing enforcement of ordinance which prohibited topless dancing). Thus, the Court has moved away
from a rigid application of the two-track approach. Note, The Content Distinction in Free
Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1917 (1989). This trend shows an
inclination to apply less demanding scrutiny to speech determined to be lower in expressive
value. Id.
52. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
53. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706-07. Arcara dealt with a New York statute which authorized

the closing of any building used as a place for prostitution. Id. at 699-700. The Court determined that because the regulation was aimed at curtailing prostitution and not at interfering
with the right to sell books, the First Amendment was not implicated. Id. at 706-07. Therefore, because the statute was a proper attempt to protect the community from illegal activity, it
was necessarily valid. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
54. 409 U.S. 109 (1972).
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Court explained that the powers granted to the states in provisions of the
Constitution can provide a basis for regulating adult entertainment. 5 Finally, in ParisAdult Theatre I v. Slaton,56 the Court declined to recognize
the right of consenting adults to view pornographic material as within the
"zone of privacy ' 5' established in previous decisions.5 8
Despite the considerable inroads allowing regulation of nude dancing and
similar conduct, the Supreme Court has made it clear that such conduct is
protected by the Constitution and can in no way be prohibited entirely."9 It
was with recognition of this precedent that Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, began his'analysis in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc." Because of this precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist found no reason to
determine if the conduct in question qualified as expression under the First
Amendment. 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist was quick to point out that the Indiana Public Indecency Statute was not aimed at banning nude dancing but
rather it prohibited nudity in any public place. 62 After defining the Indiana
statute as a time, place, and manner regulation, Chief Justice Rehnquist established the O'Brien test as the appropriate method of analysis and set out

55. See LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118-19. The Twenty-first Amendment's allowance for regulation of intoxicating liquors gives a state power not only to regulate the dispensing of alcohol in
drinking establishments, but also power to regulate sexual performances offered in such establishments. Id.
56. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
57. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (including right to
distribute contraceptives within zone of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)
(including individuals' interest in choosing to bear or beget a child within zone of privacy
regardless of marital status); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (establishing
zone of privacy). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (holding right to
engage in homosexual sodomy as outside zone of privacy). See generally Note, Fornication,
Cohabitation, and the Constitution, 77 MICH.L. REV. 252 (1978) (arguing that zone of privacy
should include decisions concerning fornication).
58. See ParisAdult Theatre, 413 U.S at 65-68 (conduct which could be validly regulated
on public streets does not become protected simply because it is moved to bar or stage).
59. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65-66 (1981) (recognizing
nude dancing as worthy of First Amendment protection); Doran, 422 U.S. at 932 (nude dancing can be entitled to First Amendment protection although it may contain only minimal
expressive qualities); LaRue, 409 U.S. at 118 (because some adult entertainment is worthy of
constitutional protection such expression cannot be prohibited entirely). Although nude dancing does not convey the messages one normally thinks of protecting, it seems well established
that it is protected by the First Amendment. R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE
SPEECH LAW 12 (1990). Wright explains that nude dancing does not convey what he labels
"Millian Values." Id. at 12. Wright defines Millian values as embodying "a more or less
discernible idea, doctrine, conception, or argument of a social nature where 'social' is understood to include broadly political, religious, ethical, and cultural concerns." Id. at 6.
60. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., - U.S .....
111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460, 115 L. Ed. 2d 504,
511 (1991).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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to apply the four elements of the test.63 Because the indecency statute was
clearly within Indiana's constitutional power, Justice Rehnquist focused on
determining if it furthered a substantial government interest." 4 Acknowledging that the exact governmental interest behind the statute was unclear,
Justice Rehnquist utilized the historical development of the statute to determine that its purpose was to protect "societal order and morality. ' 6 The
Chief Justice relied on the rhetoric of previous decisions such as ParisAdult
Theatre I v. Slaton66 and Bowers v. Hardwick6 7 to justify societal order and
morality as a substantial governmental interest.68 In determining the third
element of the O'Brien test-whether the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression-Justice Rehnquist found it necessary
to elaborate the fact that virtually all conduct conveys some message. 69
Chief Justice Rehnquist then separated the governmental interest of upholding societal order and morality from the impermissible goal of prohibiting
nude dancing by explaining that public nudity was the evil that Indiana
sought to curtail, whether it was combined with expressive conduct or not.7 °
Finally, the Chief Justice explained that the last element of the O'Brien
test-that the regulation of expressive conduct be no more than is essential
to further the government's interest-was easily met because requiring
dancer's to wear pasties and a G-string would not noticeably diminish the
message the dancers sought to convey. 7 '
Justice Scalia, although concurring in the plurality's decision, took a view

63. Id. at __,111 S. Ct. at 2460-61, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 511-12.
64. Barnes, - U.S. at _, 111 S. Ct. at 2461, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 512.
65. Id. at -. , 111 S.Ct. at 2461-62, 115 L. Ed. 2d 512-13. The Chief Justice traced the
development of the statute from as early as 1831 and included an 1877 decision which relied
on Biblical references to justify the statute. Id.
66. 413 U.S. 49, 59-60 (1973) (upholding morality as basis for regulation of obscene
material).
67. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding morality as basis for upholding regulation
prohibiting homosexual sodomy).
68. Barnes, - U.S. at -,
ll1 S. Ct. at 2462, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513.
69. Id. at -I, 111 S. Ct. at 2462, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 514. Justice Rehnquist employs the
rhetoric used in O'Brien and Stanglin which acknowledges the limitless variety of conduct
which can feasibly qualify as speech. Id.
70. Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2463, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 514. Chief Justice Rehnquist achieved
this separation by analogy. Id. In the analogy, Justice Rehnquist noted that appearing nude at
the beach conveys little if any message and is necessarily restricted. Id. Furthermore, the
Chief Justice fell back upon the facts in O'Brien and found the government's goal of maintaining selective service registration certificates, regardless of the political view of the registrant
who destroyed his certificate, analogous to Indiana's goal of preventing public nudity, regardless of the message some may seek to convey by their nudity. Id.
71. Id. at - , 111 S. Ct. at 2463, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 515. Justice Rehnquist delivered this
final point with a subtle pun. Id. The Chief Justice observed that requiring dancers to wear
pasties and a G-string would be the bare minimum necessary in achieving the state's goal of
upholding morality and order. Id.
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resembling the Court's analysis in Arcara.72 In Justice Scalia's view, the
Indiana statute was general law that was not specifically targeted at nude
dancing but public nudity in general. 73 As such, no First Amendment analysis was necessary.74 Therefore, Justice Scalia disagreed with the plurality's
application of the O'Brien test.75 In particular, Justice Scalia disagreed with
O'Brien's requirement of measuring the "importance" of governmental interests.7 6 Justice Scalia argued that the Indiana Public Indecency Statute was
valid, not because cases like Bowers and Roth had proven the upholding of
morality to be a substantial government interest, but simply because "moral
opposition to nudity supplies a rational basis for its prohibition." 77
In his concurrence, Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that the
O'Brien test was the appropriate analysis to be employed.78 However, unlike
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, Justice Souter relied not on society's view of
morality to justify the Indiana statute, but rather on the state's substantial
interest in curtailing the secondary effects of sexually oriented business.79
Thus, Justice Souter chose to directly follow the analysis developed in Renton and ruled that it was reasonable for Indiana to conclude that forbidding
totally nude dancing furthered the governmental interests of curtailing prostitution, sexual assault, and other crimes related with such conduct.8 0
Justice White, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the plurality opinion was erroneous in several respects.8 Justice
72. Compare Barnes, - U.S. at -., 111 S. Ct. at 2463, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (public indecency statute not subject to First Amendment analysis because it was
general law not directed at expression) with Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 705
(1986) (statute was general law directed at prohibiting prostitution and using it to close adult
bookstore raised no First Amendment issues).
73. Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2463, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 515 (Scalia, J., concurring).
74. Id.
75. Id. at .I, Il S. Ct. at 2467, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 520.
76. Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2467, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 520. In particular, Justice
Scalia disliked the idea of measuring the importance of the state's interests in upholding morality. Id.
77. Id. at 111 S. Ct. at 2468, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 521. Justice Scalia stressed that
although morality had served as a rational basis for the regulation of conduct that is not protected by the First Amendment, it has never been established as anything more than that. Id.
Therefore, Justice Scalia explained, it may be insufficient to justify a content-neutral abridgement of free expression. Id.
78. Barnes, - U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2468, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 521 (Souter, J., concurring).
79. Id. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2468-69, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 521. Justice Souter chose to follow
the petitioner's assertion that nude dancing encourages prostitution, sexual assault, and other
crimes. Id. at , Il S. Ct. at 2469, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 522.
80. Id. at.., 111 S.Ct at 2470, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 523. Furthermore, Justice Souter argued
that Indiana need not present localized proof of harmful secondary effects but could reasonably conclude that prohibiting nude dancing would limit the impact of such effects. Id.
81. Id. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2472, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 526 (White, J., dissenting).
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White argued that although the O'Brien test was the appropriate analysis,
the regulation in Barnes differed significantly from that in O'Brien and similar cases.8 2 Justice White stressed that regulations such as those in O'Brien
and Bowers were general prohibitions which restricted the conduct in ques-

tion under any circumstance.83 However, because the Indiana Statute was
not enforced against plays, ballets, or operas that contain nudity, Justice
White argued that the regulation was not applied as a general prohibition. 4
Furthermore, as Justice White explained, it would not be within Indiana's
constitutional power to enact a general prohibition of nudity because such a
regulation would necessarily invade constitutionally protected areas such as
one's home.8 5 However, Justice White's principal argument was that the
plurality's concession that requiring a dancer to wear pasties and a G-string
would diminish the actors' ability to convey a message was in fact a concession that the regulation was related to the suppression of expressive conduct.8 6 As such, Justice White contended that the Indiana Statute was a
content-based regulation and could only be upheld if it was "narrowly
drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest."8 7 Therefore, according to Justice White, the Indiana statute would fail this test even if a
compelling interest were present because the State had ignored alternative
regulations that would not interfere with the expressiveness of nude danc-

ing.8 8 As such, the regulation was not narrowly tailored and was necessarily
invalid. 9
Justice White's dissent is an attempt to bring the Court's analysis of time,
place, and manner regulations back into the traditional two-track approach.' Although the Court is not willing to take the expansive view of-

U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2472-73, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 526-27.
83. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2472, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 526.

82. Barnes, -

84. Id. at _, 111 S. Ct. at 2473, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 527.
85. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2472, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 526.
86. See Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2474, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 528. Justice White
explained that the communicative impact of the dancers' message was increased by the nudity
of the dancers. Id. For example, the sight of a clothed dancer has a different impact on the
viewer than does the sight of a nude dancer. Id. Therefore, argued Justice White, nudity is an
expressive component of the message conveyed. Id.
87. Id. at , 111 S. Ct. at 2474, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 529.
88. Id. at
111 S. Ct. at 2475, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 529. Justice White listed a number of
I'
alternative methods of achieving the governmental interests presented by both Justices Rehnquist and Souter. Id. Among these were: requiring that dancers remain at a minimum distance from spectators; limiting nude dancing to certain hours; dispersing such entertainment
throughout the community; or criminalizing prostitution and related behavior. Id.
89. Barnes, - U.S. at -, III S. Ct. at 2475, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 530.
90. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., - U.S.., -, 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2474, 115 L. Ed. 2d
504, 528-29 (White, J., dissenting) (Indiana Public Indecency Statute was content-based regulation that could not be upheld unless it was narrowly tailored to achieve compelling state
interest).
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fered by Justice Scalia,91 it is clear that the Court supports increasing the
state's power to restrict expressive conduct via subject-matter based
regulations.92

To understand the impact of Barnes, it is necessary to realize that Renton,
although presented as an attempt to re-establish the traditional two-track
approach, 93 was actually the instrumental case in developing an intermediate
level of scrutiny for subject-matter based regulations of expressive conduct. 94
91. See id. at -., Ill S. Ct. at 2465, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 517-18 (Scalia, J., concurring) (no
First Amendment analysis necessary if regulation not specifically aimed at curtailing expressive conduct).
92. Compare Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217 (1975) (striking down
subject-matter based restriction of expressive conduct as unconstitutional content-based regulation) with City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) (upholding
subject-matter based restriction of expressive conduct as valid, content-neutral regulation).
The turning point in the Court's analysis was that it looked beyond the face of the regulation
to find a content-neutral purpose. See Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis
After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1907-08 (1989) (Court used content-neutral purpose
of curtailing secondary effects to justify less demanding scrutiny although ordinance in Renton
content-based on its face). This is a break with the Court's previous approach. See New York
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (upholding child pornography regulation because such
material is not protected by the First Amendment). It is important to note that the Court has
approved regulations based on content prior to this trend. See Daniel A. Farber, Content
Regulation and the FirstAmendment.- A Revisionist View, 68 GEO. L.J. 727, 728 (1980) (regulations restricting obscenity, misleading advertising, and "indecent" language on radio have been
upheld). However, when this has been the case, the expression in question has generally been
determined to be low in expressive value. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content. The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81,
82 (1978) ("low value" expression determined to deserve less than full protection of First
Amendment).
93. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (labeling ordinance based on subject-matter consistent
with previous definitions of content-neutral regulations of expressive conduct).
94. Compare Renton, 475 U.S. at 950 (applying lower level of scrutiny to subject-matter
based regulation of expressive conduct) with Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217-18 (1975) (applying
strict scrutiny to subject-matter based regulation of expression). The Renton test followed a
trend in the Court's analysis that allowed for intermediate scrutiny of content-based regulations determined to be lower in expressive value. See Note, The Content Distinction in Free
Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1917-18 (1989) (explaining that twotrack approach developed by Warren Court has been replaced with intermediate level of scrutiny of low value speech). This trend was a reaction to the rigid nature of the traditional twotrack approach. See id. at 1918 (rigid application of two-track approach results in denial of
constitutional protection for deserving forms of expression). However, an intermediate level of
scrutiny has its drawbacks as well. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 12-18, at 940-43 (2d ed. 1988). The approach requires the difficult process of classifying and
defining types of expression. Cf Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Viriginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764-65 (1976) (acknowledging near impossibility of differentiating between commercial and non-commercial speech). As such, the criteria for granting
constitutional protection vary and the risk of impermissible content-based restrictions of expressive conduct exists. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at
943-44 (2d ed. 1988). Because expression may eventually be categorized by the level of scru-
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Under the Court's present approach, content-based regulations of expressive
conduct are subjected to traditional track-one analysis and upheld only
where the government proves that its regulation is narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest.9" Regulations that are determined to be
content-neutral restrictions of expressive conduct will be subjected to tracktwo analysis and upheld so long as they serve a substantial governmental
interest without unreasonably limiting alternative avenues of communication.96 At an intermediate level of scrutiny, subject-matter based regulations
of expressive conduct can receive the less demanding scrutiny applied on
track-two if the government
advances a sufficient, content-neutral purpose
97
for the regulation.

tiny applied, government could seek to impermissibly regulate content via categories that receive less demanding scrutiny. Id.
95. Barnes, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2474, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 529 (White, J. dissenting).
This is consistent with traditional track-one analysis. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1989) (holding content-based regulation invalid because it
was not precisely drawn to serve compelling state interest); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti,
435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978) (striking down statute prohibiting corporate contributions made to
influence voters because state failed to advance compelling interest). Generally stated, the rule
under track-one analysis is that "whenever the harm feared could be averted by a further
exchange of ideas, governmental suppression is conclusively deemed unnecessary." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-8, at 833-34 (2d ed. 1988). This
rule is a realization of the dangerous potential of content-based regulations. See Note, The
Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis after Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913-14
(1989) (content-based regulations which favor particular views can be influential in determining outcome of publice debate).
96. See, e.g., Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1981) (regulation limiting number of organizations at state fair valid as applied to
religious sect); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 (total prohibition on advertising of prescription drug prices as exceeding governmental interest in maintaining professionalism among licensed pharmacists); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-08 (1940)
(requirement of state approval before soliciting invalid prior restraint of protected speech).
This approach allows for efficient balancing between the protection of First Amendment freedoms and legitimate governmental interests. Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 77 (1987). The approach allows the Court to examine regulations that
seriously infringe upon First Amendment rights, but does not sacrifice governmental interests
when First Amendment rights are only incidentally affected. Id. Simply stated, "the greater
the interference with effective communication, the greater the burden on government to justify
the restriction." Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189, 190 (1983).
97. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 50-51 (ordinance grouping adult theaters in one location
provided sufficient alternative avenues of communication). But see Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 21112 (ordinance prohibiting display of movies containing nudity at drive-in theaters left no adequate alternative avenues of communication). It is important to note that although the Court
in Barnes stated that it was applying the O'Brien test, its analysis in Barnes resembled the
"alternative avenues of communication" approach. See Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct at
2463, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 514-15 (construing statute to be "narrowly tailored"). However, this
approach arguably contradicts the meaning of content-neutrality. See MARTIN H. REDISH,
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As Justice White's dissent elaborates, because the Indiana Public Indecency Statute was selectively enforced only against nude dancing offered in
businesses such as the Kitty Kat Lounge, it was not content-neutral.9 s In
fact, the statute was aimed at curtailing a particular subject-matter of expressive conduct, erotic nude dancing.99 However, the Court met with a stumbling block in Barnes because, unlike Renton, where the government sought
to regulate the location of businesses offering nude dancing and similar expressive conduct, the Indiana Public Indecency Statute sought to enter such
businesses and regulate the manner in which expressive conduct was performed.co However, as the dissent's analysis of Justice Souter's opinion
elaborated, requiring a dancer to wear pasties and a G-string will have little
effect on the criminal activity associated with a business offering nude danc-

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 120 (1984) (regulation legitimately aimed
only at curtailing conduct should apply to all who engage in that conduct regardless of
message conveyed). This violates the principle of equality which is the basis of the First
Amendment's protection against government regulation of expressive content. See Kenneth L.
Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U. CI. L. REV. 20, 21
(1975) (arguing that equal application of First Amendment promotes self governance, search
for truth, individual self-worth).
98. Barnes, - U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2474, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 528 (White, J., dissenting).
99. Cf. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 211 (ordinance which prohibited drive-in theaters from
showing films containing nudity labeled subject-matter based). Because the Indiana statute
prohibits any expression containing nudity, it appeared to be a subject-matter based regulation.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 239 (1983) (defining subject-matter regulations as those directed at entire field of
expression). Furthermore, the Indiana statute is consistent with other regulations the Court
has determined to be subject-matter based. See Consolidated Edison, 447 U.S. at 537 (labeling
regulation subject-matter based because it restricted any material addressing issue of nuclear
power). However, regulations that appear to be based only on subject-matter can, through
application, be used to disadvantage a particular viewpoint. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 81, 109-10 (1978) (explaining that because one side of issue may be more affected
by subject-matter restriction, government can effectively disadvantage that side's position).
100. Compare Barnes, - U.S. at - n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 2462 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513 n.2
(public indecency statute prohibits specific conduct) with Renton, 475 U.S. at 44 (ordinance
sought to exclude businesses offering sexually oriented conduct from certain locations). This
was a step beyond traditional time, place, and manner regulations because no alternative
method of conveying the message existed. See Heffron, 452 U.S. at 654-55 (upholding limitation on number of organizations distributing material at state fair). Thus, the statute in Barnes
not only had an impact on the dancers but also affected the community. Cf Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 222
(1983) (denying some avenues of expression may significantly impair free circulation of ideas).
This greater impact can be an indication of improper legislative motive. See Geoffrey R.
Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 110-11 (1978) (narrowly defined subject-matter regulations
having an impact on single issue, or narrow class of issues, indicate potential legislative intent
to restrict expression concerning that issue).
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ing. 0 ' As such, the secondary effects analysis developed in Renton was not
02
available to qualify the Indiana statute as a content-neutral regulation.1
The Court instead had to develop morality as a new content-neutral basis for
justifying a subject-matter based regulation of expressive conduct." 3 Thus,
Barnes is a reinforcement of the principal that, given a purpose removed

from the regulation of content, the government can use subject-matter based
regulations to circumvent the strict scrutiny that track-one applies to content-based restrictions of expression." °4
The decision in Barnesrepresents a powerful tool that can be implemented

by government to infringe upon protected forms of expressive conduct. 0 5

101. See Barnes, - U.S. at - n.2, 111 S. Ct. at 2474 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 528 n.2
(White, J., dissenting) (Erznoznik effects not causually related to nude dancing).
102. Compare Barnes, - U.S at -., Ill S. Ct. at 2461, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 512-13 (protecting societal order and morality served as content-neutral basis for statute prohibiting nudity)
with Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (curtailing harmful secondary effects acknowledged as contentneutral purpose for ordinance regulating location of adult theaters).
103. Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2462, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513.
I,Ill S. Ct. at 2461-62, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513 (govern104. CompareBarnes, - U.S. at
mental goal of protecting morality sufficient to justify less demanding scrutiny of regulation
based on subject-matter of expressive conduct) with Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (governmental goal
of curtailing harmful secondary effects sufficient to justify less demanding scrutiny of subjectmatter based regulation of expressive conduct). Given a content-neutral purpose, the Court
can justify applying traditional track-two analysis. Cf Virginia State Bd of Pharmacy, 425
U.S. at 771 (defining content-neutral regulations as those justified without reference to content
of speech being regulated). This principal is very disturbing because it allows the government
to look beyond the face of an otherwise impermissible regulation to find a content-neutral
justification. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-3, at 798
n. 17 (2d ed. 1988) (logical conclusion of such practice is erosion of First Amendment protection). Even more foreboding was the Renton Court's limitation of this examination to a search
for only good motive. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48 (otherwise valid regulation will not be struck
down because alleged, impermissible motive exists). However, the Court has lessened the potential impact of this approach in more recent decisions, requiring that there be an objective,
causal connection between the government's content-neutral goal and the regulation. See Boos
v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (governmental purpose of preventing psychological damage
to diplomats insufficient to justify prohibiting picket signs outside embassies). Absence of a
causal connection is an indication of governments attempt to impermissibly regulate expressive
conduct. Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L.
REv. 1904, 1923 (1989). However, such an absence is unlikely because the government has a
number of potential content-neutral goals available to justify its regulation. Id. Therefore,
more than a cursory investigation of the government's motive is necessary. Id.
105. See Barnes, - U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2462-63, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513-15 (contentneutral purpose of protecting morality sufficient to justify complete prohibition of nude dancing); Cf Renton, 475 U.S. at 54-55 (content-neutral purpose of curtailing secondary effects
sufficient to justify regulation of adult theaters because of subject-matter displayed). Furthermore, the Court has shown some indication that this tool could be applied to speech outside
the realm of sexually oriented business. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 321 (hinting that sufficient content-neutral purpose would justify regulation of political speech). However, the scope of this
tool remains unclear. See Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech Analysis After Renton,
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Simply by advancing a purpose removed from the restriction of the message
conduct conveys, government can effectively abridge or even eliminate a
form of expression.' ° 6 The impact of this tool is tempered by the requirements that subject-matter regulations serve a substantial governmental inter-

est and leave open alternative avenues of communication. °7 However, the
Court in Barnes did not apply this balancing test appropriately. 0 8 Because
nudity was an essential part of the message the dancers' sought to convey, a
restriction on nudity left no alternative method of communicating that

message. 1o9 Furthermore, the Court sent a signal that virtually any content-

102 HARv. L. REV. 1904, 1912 (1989) (the issue remains unclear because three justices in Boos
dissented on jurisdictional grounds).
106. See Barnes,- U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2462-63, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513-14 (protection
of morality and societal order sufficient to justify prohibition of nude dancing); see also Renton,
475 U.S. at 50 (governmental interest in curtailing secondary effects sufficient to justify regulation of adult theaters). This rule developed from reinterpretation of established constitutional
doctrine. Cf. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy,425 U.S. at 771 (defining content-neutral regulations as those justified without reference to content of speech being regulated). It is important
to note that many of the Court's decisions in this area have upheld paternalistic regulations.
See Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2462, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513 (protecting morality and
societal order); see also Renton, 475 U.S at 48 (protecting neighborhoods surrounding adult
theaters). The Court has traditionally taken an antipaternalistic view of the First Amendment.
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 189, 212-13 (1983) (ordinarily government cannot restrict information based on a belief
that citizens will make undesirable decisions with such information).
107. See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (refusing to
recognize availability of nude dancing in neighboring community as adequate alternative avenue of communication); see also Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 217 (requiring a higher fencing around
drive-in theaters before allowing display of films containing nudity would be impractical alternative). This balancing approach provides a method of correcting many of the problems associated with traditional two-track analysis. See Note, The Content Distinction in Free Speech
Analysis After Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1919 (1989) (this approach can effectively
accommodate peripheral First Amendment interests as well as provide full First Amendment
protection for more valued forms of speech). Thus, if properly applied, the balancing approach allows the Court to weigh government's substantial interests on one side and the extent
to which protected expression is abridged on the other. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23, at 979 (2d ed. 1988). However, the Court has not always
applied this test rigorously. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52 (allowing city to rely on data from
other communities to establish regulation of secondary effects as substantial governmental
interest).
108. See Barnes, - U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2475, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 529-30 (White, J.,
dissenting) (because state ignored less restrictive means of protecting order and morality, statute not narrowly drawn).
109. See id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2474, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 528 (White, J., dissenting) (because
nudity was integral part of message dancers sought to convey, prohibition of nudity removed
ability to convey that message). Because Indiana denied the dancers any alternative avenues of
communication it ignored its responsibility to keep the channels of communication open. See
John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administration Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1335 (1970) (state is obligated to protect avenues of communication). As such, the danc-
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neutral purpose will justify a subject-matter based regulation of expressive
conduct by allowing morality to stand as a substantial governmental interest.' 0 As such, Barnes stands as a foreboding signal of potentially drastic
reductions in First Amendment freedoms."'
The decision in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. provides government with a
tool that can infringe upon protected forms of expressive conduct. By advancing a purpose removed from the restriction of the message conduct conveys, government can effectively abridge or even eliminate a form of

ers were denied the ability to communicate their ideas to others. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 193 (1983) (limiting
particular areas of communication potentially eliminates individual's ability to communicate
particular views). Furthermore, nude dancing is conduct recognized as worthy of First
Amendment protection. Barnes,- U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2460, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 510-11. As
such, restricting it entirely contradicts established First Amendment doctrine. See Schad, 452
U.S. at 75-76 (complete prohibition of nude dancing unconstitutional).
110. Morality has served as the basis for curtailing conduct in previous Supreme Court
cases. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (protection of morality sufficient to
justify prohibition of homosexual sodomy); see also, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957) (morality sufficient justification for prohibition of obscene material). However, those
cases can easily be distinguished from Barnes because the conduct regulated did not qualify for
constitutional protection. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (finding no constitutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy); see also Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (obscenity is not protected by First
Amendment). Further, nude dancing has been recognized as worthy of First Amendment
protection. Barnes, - U.S. at -, I11 S. Ct. at 2460, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 511. Even if the Indiana
statute is analyzed as a content-neutral regulation, the Court's approach should have been to
critically examine a regulation that seriously infringed upon First Amendment freedoms. See
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV.
189, 193 (1983) (under Court's content-neutral balancing approach, greater impact on First
Amendment interests warrants more critical examination of regulation). As such, Indiana
should have had to prove that an important governmental objection would be sacrificed by a
regulation that was less restrictive than a complete prohibition of nude dancing. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-23, at 984 (2d ed. 1988) (even
under content-neutral analysis, a significant infringement upon free expression warrants more
stringent analysis). Thus, the Court's decision in Barnes appears to be at odds with established
constitutional doctrine. Cf. Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (government cannot selectively shield
public from expression determined to be more offensive than others).
11. See Barnes, - U.S. at -, Ill S. Ct. at 2463, 115 L. Ed 2d at 515 (protection of
morality sufficient justification for complete prohibition of conduct protected by First Amendment). The government has an obligation to keep the channels of communication open. John
Hart Ely, Legislative and Administration Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L. J.
1205, 1335-36 (1970) (government's content-neutral purpose may need to be sacrificed to accommodate freedom of expression). This obligation was not met in Barnes. See Barnes, __
U.S. at - n.2, Ill S. Ct. at 2462 n.2, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 513 n.2 (prohibiting nude dancing
entirely). Therefore, the decision in Barnes ultimately allows all but "gratuitous inhibitions"
of speech. Cf John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizingand
Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1488 (1975) (government
need only advance a content-neutral purpose to justify regulation of expressive conduct under
O'Brien test).
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expression. At first glance, this appears to be a major revision in First
Amendment doctrine. However, properly understood, Barnes represents
merely the most recent step in an evolving trend that gives the government
greater room for regulating expression. Traditionally, any content-based
regulation of expressive conduct was upheld only where it was narrowly
drawn to achieve a compelling governmental interest. However, in cases
such as Young v. American Mini Theatres,Inc. and Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. the Court subtly revised this established constitutional doctrine.
As the most recent step in this trend, Barnes provides that given virtually
any content-neutral purpose, subject-matter based regulations can be used to
significantly curtail expressive conduct.
Although the Court requires that such regulations of expression advance a
substantial interest and provide alternative methods of communication, the
Court in Barnes did not properly apply this rule. The use of morality as the
purpose for prohibiting nude dancing resulted in the complete restriction of
a form of expression protected by the First Amendment. This result is disturbing to say the least. It is an established principal of constitutional law
that where an actor intends to convey a message by his conduct and there is
a great likelihood that his message will be understood, that expression is
protected by the First Amendment. The bedrock principal of the First
Amendment is that government can not abridge expression based on its content. Barnes effectively erodes this principal.
Fred S. Wilson
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